Presently, the Department of Defense's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise consists of a wide array of Title 10 forces within control of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and numerous Title 32 formations generated by the National Guard. The dedicated response force consists of over 18,000 service members. This expansive enterprise is costly to maintain and service members dedicated to CBRN response units are generally unavailable to the services for overseas deployment purposes. In coming times of increased fiscal restraint and reduced force levels, the Department of Defense (DOD) should consider reducing the size and scope of this enterprise. To properly resize the enterprise, a realistic assessment of the CBRN risk to the Homeland must be considered, and the improved capability of the civil response enterprise must be recognized.
Tailoring the Military Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Enterprise
Every dollar misspent in the name of security weakens our already precarious economic condition, indebts us to foreign nations, and shackles the future of our children and grandchildren. Our $16 trillion national debt has become the new red menace not only lurking in our midst, but created and sustained by shortsighted and irresponsible decisions made in Washington.
-Senator Tom Coburn 1
At the time of this writing, the U.S. national debt stands at approximately 16.5 trillion dollars and continues to grow at an exponential rate. It is clear to most that the U.S. Government must reduce spending as part of a plan to reduce the debt. As stated in the President's National Security Strategy, "The United States Government has an obligation to make the best use of taxpayer money, and our ability to achieve long-term goals depends upon our fiscal responsibility." The Department of Defense (DOD) will need to critically examine all functions in order to appropriately down-size the force and reduce overall defense spending. One of these functional responsibilities is Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 2 (CBRN) consequence management. The National Response Framework (NRF) and the Unified Command Plan task the DOD with this responsibility.
In a CBRN incident, the primary focus is to mitigate the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear device. DOD's CBRN response enterprise or "CRE"
provides the nation with a dedicated, trained, scalable, and tailorable military CBRN response capability. 4 forces generated by the National Guard. In total, the enterprise consists of over 18,000
military personnel prepared year-round to respond to CBRN events. The CRE is large and expensive to maintain. The services draw forces dedicated to the CRE from DOD's combat power and for the most part these forces are unavailable for overseas deployment purposes. In addition, significant costs are incurred equipping, training, certifying and evaluating enterprise service members on an ongoing basis.
In response to the requirement to reduce the defense budget, the U.S. The days of building expansive enterprises without serious regard to cost-benefit analysis are ending. The challenges before us will require resourcefulness and an integrated approach that wisely balances risks and assets, and that recognizes where we must improve, and where others are better suited to help implement aspects of the strategy. The national preparedness goal shall define the core capabilities necessary to prepare for the specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, and shall emphasize actions aimed at achieving an integrated, layered, and all-of-Nation preparedness approach that optimizes the use of available resources. 8 The President further required in PPD-8 that DHS produce a National Preparedness System -"an integrated set of guidance, programs, and processes that will enable the Nation to meet the national preparedness goal." 9 The desired end-state of our National Preparedness System is to achieve and sustain coordinated capabilities 4 to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards in a way that balances risk with resources.
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The last document mandated by the President in PPD-8 was the National Preparedness Report (NPR), which DHS published in March 2012. The annual NPR evaluates the nation's capabilities with regard to prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery from threats and hazards. The results of the first National Preparedness Report will be discussed later in this paper with special consideration given to increasing levels of civil CBRN response capability that exist today. 3125.01C is very important and bares significant consideration to the question addressed by this paper. The directive tasks USNORTHCOM to be prepared to respond to three nearly simultaneous significant terrorist attacks, or one "catastrophic CBRN incident" (generally regarded as a 10 kiloton nuclear explosion). The scope of these scenarios is very large, and drives the requirement for a very large DOD response structure. Determining the reasonableness of this requirement is of paramount importance, and will be further discussed when CBRN risk is examined later in this paper.
DOD's Role in Disaster Response
The NRF explains the CRE's role in disaster response. 
Non-DOD CBRN Response Capability
The required level of DOD CBRN response capability should be tempered by the overall capabilities and resources available for CBRN response in the non-DOD or civil response enterprise. The more substantial the civil response capability is at the local, state and tribal level, the less need there is for federal military response.
The 2012 National Preparedness Report found that the Nation has increased its collective preparedness not only for the countless threats posed by those who wish to harm America's homeland, but also for the many natural and technological hazards that face the Nation's communities. Areas of national strength include planning, operational coordination, intelligence and information sharing, environmental response/health and safety, mass search and rescue operations, operational communications and public health and medical services. 20 These strengths involve contributions from across the whole community. State, local, tribal, and territorial partners have built a network of multi-disciplinary capabilities that they use to manage the vast majority of emergencies. Additionally, federal preparedness grant assistance programs have helped build and enhance state, local tribal and territorial capabilities through multi-year investments across mission areas.
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Several specific areas of strength in non-DOD response capability addressed in the 2012 NPR bear consideration when analyzing the appropriate size of the DOD CBRN response enterprise. These areas of strength mirror capabilities built into the CRE and may indicate that current levels of DOD capabilities in these areas are no longer required. First, the Nation has developed a mature set of assets for addressing hazardous materials incidents. There are over 1,100 state and local hazardous material (HAZMAT) response teams positioned throughout the country. Together, these teams provide HAZMAT response coverage to over 76% of the Nation's population (see Figure   1 ). 23 Second, the Nation has a highly mature structural collapse search and rescue capability, due in large part to the build-up of state and local search and rescue assets. 24 Ninety-seven percent of the U.S. population lives within a four-hour drive of a structural collapse team (see Figure 2) . 25 Third, the NPR indicates a wide range of partners contribute to a highly responsive public health and medical capability. And fourth, state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement professionals provide on-scene 9 security and protection for routine events and are capable in providing security for emergencies of greater size and complexity through extensive mutual aid resources. These four capabilities; hazardous materials response, search and rescue, medical services and security are assessed as national strengths by the National Preparedness Report. These same capabilities represent a significant amount of the structure built within the DOD CBRN response enterprise.
10
The DOD CBRN Response Enterprise Figure 3 illustrates the current enterprise. conduct casualty search and extraction, decontamination, medical triage, security, and command and control in the vicinity of a CBRN incident in order to save lives and mitigate human suffering in support of civil authorities. 36 The HRF is a regional asset. In addition to the capabilities provided by its supported CST and CERFP elements, the HRF structure includes a brigade-level command and control section and a security element. HRFs are available for deployment within 6-12 hours of notification. HRF units may command and control multiple CST's and CERFPs. Figure 5 illustrates the structure of a deployed HRF with assigned non-organic units. The Title 32 response enterprise is scalable, responsive and flexible. In the wake of a CBRN event, the Governor of the effected state not only has access to his own state's National Guard assets; he or she also has the ability to reach across state boundaries for additional Title 32 response forces. The process that enables this interstate cooperation is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system.
The EMAC is a congressionally approved interstate mutual aid compact that provides a legal structure by which states affected by an emergency may request assistance from other states. 38 Following a state disaster declaration, a Governor can rapidly draw upon Title 32 forces from several states to respond to larger scale CBRN incidents.
In addition to the dedicated CBRN response forces described above, generalpurpose National Guard follow-on forces are available regionally to respond to CBRN disaster scenes. These forces represent significant additional capacity to augment dedicated Title 32 CRE forces, and may lessen the need for Title 10 response to an incident. and pragmatists. According to the optimists, CBRN terrorism is a ''very low probability, very low consequence'' threat. 45 Pessimists believe that CBRN terrorism is a ''low (but growing) probability, high consequence'' threat. 46 According to pragmatists, CBRN terrorism is a ''low probability, low consequence'' threat. 47 Further illustrating the difficulty in accurately assessing risk; in 2009, JASON, an independent scientific advisory group that provides consulting services to the U.S. government on defense science and technology issues, was asked to evaluate current and proposed models for anticipating rare, catastrophic events such as CBRN terrorism.
Their conclusion was that ''it is simply not possible to validate (evaluate) predictive models of rare events that have not occurred, and unvalidated models cannot be relied upon." 48 In light of the wide disparity of expert opinion concerning this issue and the lack of quantitative evidence available, it is certainly beyond the scope of this paper to attempt determine the actual level of risk associated with CBRN attack in the Homeland.
It is though within this paper's scope of to assess the reasonableness of the CRE's current response requirement mandated by CJSI 3125.01C. As stated earlier, this mandate specifies the need to respond to three nearly simultaneous, geographically dispersed, significant domestic CBRN incidents, or one catastrophic CBRN incident There has never been a CBRN incident in the Homeland requiring DOD CBRN response, and the use of CBRN in terrorist attacks worldwide is nearly nonexistent. In view of these facts, it seems extremely unlikely that three domestic CBRN attacks would happen at the same time.
Shifting to the factor of severity, there is again little historic precedence of significant risk. The most severe consequence of the above-mentioned CBRN terrorist incidents was the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack, which killed 13 people and injured 5000. This is the only terrorist CBRN incident in recent world-wide history that would have warranted a significant DOD CBRN response.
A terrorist nuclear detonation in the Homeland (the aforementioned "catastrophic CBRN incident") represents the highest consequence CBRN attack, but holds the lowest probability of occurrence. Although the severity of a nuclear blast is not argued, the likelihood of such an attack is debated. Matthew Bunn from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government calculates that there is a 3% chance of nuclear terrorism every year. 51 On the other hand, John Mueller, a Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, calculates the odds of a successful nuclear terrorist attack at between one in a million and one in three billion. 52 Historically, there has of course never been a terrorist nuclear detonation, nor has there ever been one attempted within public knowledge. According to Albert Mauroni, a senior policy analyst with the Air Force, "We have no compelling evidence that any nation has provided a terrorist group with chemical or biological weapons -why on earth would they provide a terrorist group with nuclear weapons? It doesn't make sense." 
Conclusion and Recommendations
A realistic assessment of risk does not justify maintaining a DOD enterprise to respond to the "three nearly simultaneous CBRN incidents / one catastrophic CBRN incident" level of capability that is currently required by the Chairman's mandate.
Terrorist have not used CBRN as a method of attack anywhere in the world in the past decade; a scenario involving three simultaneously CBRN attacks in the Homeland is extremely remote. There has never been a catastrophic nuclear event, and one occurring in the foreseeable future is very unlikely.
If there is a CBRN attack in the Homeland, civil response capability at the local and state levels is far more robust than it was when DOD's enterprise was developed. In addition to streamlining the DOD CBRN response enterprise, the US Government should consider that the enterprise brings value beyond its CBRN consequence management mission. Utilizing CRE force structure as an asset for allhazards response adds value to the enterprise. Leveraging the CRE to aid in response to natural disasters adds value to the taxpayer dollars spent in maintaining the enterprise.
Rescaling the CBRN response enterprise increases both operational and political risk. In a world of constrained resources, however, choices must be made and much potential harm must be left unaddressed. Deciding how much of our societal resources to dedicate to homeland security and how to allocate those resources across the myriad of homeland security domains is an exceptionally difficult public policy problem.
59
An objective, holistic reassessment of the DOD CBRN response enterprise is warranted. The Department of Defense must tailor the CRE to the current environment.
To do so it must realistically assess risk and consider existing civil response capability.
The resulting enterprise will be less expensive to the Nation and will not unnecessarily overburden the Nation's forces.
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